|Abstract||With resources hinted at in different ways by both Duhem and Quine, it is argued that some of their misgivings about empirical confirmation, or crucial experiments, may be exaggerated or unfounded; and that such experiments, suitably conceived, can give good meaning to empirical sentences. With appropriate meanings one can then wonder about synonymy and analyticity.|
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