Joseph Agassi
| Abstract | Analogies have been traditionally recognized as a proper part of inductive procedures, akin to generalizations. Seldom, however, have they been presented as superior to generalizations, in the attainability of a higher degree of certitude for their conclusions or in other respects. Though Bacon de6nitely preferred analogy to generalization~, the tradition seems to me to go the other way ââ¬â until the recent publication of works by Mary B. Hesse {[2], pp. 21-28 and passim) and, perhaps, R. Harre {[lj, pp. 23-28 and passim). The aim of the present note is to argue the following two points. First, generalizations proper are preferable to predictions from past observations to a single future observation, since the latter are std hoc. Second, analogies are either generalizations proper ââ¬â perhaps higher-level ones ââ¬â or ad hoc. In any case, they are not more certain than generalizations, but they are still equally legitimate | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Joseph Agassi (1964). Analogies as Generalizations. Philosophy of Science 31 (4):351-356.
Joseph Agassi (1978). Williams Dodges Agassi's Criticism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (3):248-252.
Joseph Agassi & Judith Buber Agassi (1987). Sexism in Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 17 (4):515-522.
Mark Lance & Margaret Little (2004). Defeasibility and the Normative Grasp of Context. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):435 - 455.
David K. Henderson (1991). On the Testability of Psychological Generalizations (Psychological Testability). Philosophy of Science (December) 586 (December):586-606.
Joseph Agassi (1981). To Save Verisimilitude. Mind 90 (360):576-579.
Mario Bunge (1960). The Place of Induction in Science. Philosophy of Science 27 (3):262-270.
Joseph C. Pitt (1981). The Role of Inductive Generalizations in Sellars' Theory of Explanation. Theory and Decision 13 (4):345-356.
C. Kenneth Waters (1998). Causal Regularities in the Biological World of Contingent Distributions. Biology and Philosophy 13 (1).
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-08-12Total downloads6 ( #145,407 of 548,973 )Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |

