On the Reliability of Science: The Critical Rationalist Version

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (1):100-115 (2013)
Error and Inference discusses Deborah Mayo’s theory that connects the reliability of science to scientific evidence. She sees it as an essential supplement to the negative principles of critical rationalism. She and Aris Spanos, her co-editor, declare that the discussions in the book amount to tremendous progress. Yet most contributors to the book misconstrue the Socratic character of critical rationalism because they ignore a principal tenet: criticism in and of itself comprises progress, and empirical refutation comprises learning from experience. Critical rationalism should be recommended in the critical spirit, not as dogma
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DOI 10.1177/0048393111400705
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