Graduate studies at Western
Dissertation, University of Gothenburg (2008)
|Abstract||The present study is concerned the viability of the primary method in contemporary philosophy, i.e., conceptual analysis. Starting out by tracing the roots of this methodology to Platonic philosophy, the study questions whether such a methodology makes sense when divorced from Platonic philosophy, and develops a framework for a kind of analysis that is more in keeping with recent psychological research on categorization. Finally, it is shown that this kind of analysis can be applied to the concept of justification in a manner that furthers the epistemological goal of providing intellectual guidance.|
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