In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40 (2013)
Abstract
Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of monism cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value, an examination of the most promising pluralist counterexamples casts serious doubt upon the claim that there is any such evidence
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References found in this work BETA
Jason Baehr (2009). Is There a Value Problem? In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. 42--59.
Ben Bradley (2006). Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):111 - 130.
Marian David (2001). Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press.

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