Causation and Decision

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):111-131 (2010)
Abstract
Sophisticated ‘tickle’-style defences of Evidential Decision Theory take your motivational state to screen off your act from any state that is causally independent of it, thus ensuring that EDT and CDT converge. That leads to unacceptable instability in cases in which the correct action is obvious. We need a more liberal conception of what the agent controls. It follows that an ordinary deliberator should sometimes consider the past and not only the future to be subject to her present choice
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References found in this work BETA
Arif Ahmed (2005). Evidential Decision Theory and Medical Newcomb Problems. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):191-198.
Sarah Broadie (2002). Alternative World-Histories. Philosophical Papers 31 (2):117-143.

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