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Philosophy of Science 79 (3):386-395 (2012)
Abstract
Opponents of Causal Decision Theory (CDT) sometimes claim (i) that it gives the wrong advice in Egan-style cases, where the CDT-endorsed act brings news that it causes a bad outcome; (ii) that CDT gives the right advice in Newcomb cases, where it is known in advance that the CDT-act causes you to be richer than the alternative. This paper argues that (i) and (ii) cannot both be true if rational preference over acts is transitive.
Keywords Causal decision theory  Newcomb's problem
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David Lewis (1981). Causal Decision Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
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