Walters on Conjunction Conditionalization

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):115-122 (2011)
Abstract
This discussion note examines a recent argument for the principle that any counterfactual with true components is itself true. That argument rests upon two widely accepted principles of counterfactual logic to which the paper presents counterexamples. The conclusion speculates briefly upon the wider lessons that philosophers should draw from these examples for the semantics of counterfactuals
Keywords Counterfactual conditionals  Conjunction conditionalization
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PhilPapers Archive Arif Ahmed, Walters on Conjunction Conditionalization
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References found in this work BETA
Lee Walters (2009). Morgenbesser's Coin and Counterfactuals with True Components. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):365-379.
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