Private language questions in contemporary analytical philosophy analytical study of Wittgenstein's treatments of private language and its implications
| Abstract | Wittgenstein's treatment of private language is the dissolution of some of the major problems in traditional philosophy. Philosophical problems, for Wittgenstein, are the conceptual confusion arising due to the abuse of language. They can be fully dispensed with by commanding a clear view of language. Language, for Wittgenstein, is on the one hand, the source of philosophical problems while, on the other hand, it is a means to dispense with them. Private language is one such issue which is ultimately rooted I a mistaken conception of language and is the sources of various philosophical problems/ puzzles. | |||||||||
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