Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts

Logos and Episteme 1 (2):211-219 (2010)
An intuitive view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement says that when epistemic peers disagree, they should suspend judgment. This abstemious view seems to embody a kind of detachment appropriate for rational beings; moreover, it seems to promote a kind of conciliatory inclination that makes for irenic and cooperative further discussion. Like many strategies for cooperation, however, the abstemious view creates opportunities for free-riding. In this essay, the authors argue that the believer who suspends judgment in the face of peer disagreement is vulnerable to a kind of manipulation on the part of more tenacious peers. The result is that the abstemious view can have the effect of encouraging dogmatism.
Keywords epistemology  disagreement  dialogue  agnosticism
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,831
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Mark Vorobej (2011). Distant Peers. Metaphilosophy 42 (5):708-722.
Axel Gelfert (2011). Who is an Epistemic Peer? Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.
Bryan Frances (2012). Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):1 - 21.
Brandon Carey (2011). Possible Disagreements and Defeat. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381.
Jennifer Lackey (2008). What Should We Do When We Disagree? In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. OUP 274-93.
Tomas Bogardus (2013). Disagreeing with the (Religious) Skeptic. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):5-17.
David Killoren (2010). Moral Intuitions, Reliability and Disagreement. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-35.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

42 ( #78,864 of 1,724,747 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

11 ( #59,632 of 1,724,747 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.