Holding One's Own

Argumentation 22 (4):571-584 (2008)
Abstract
There is a tension with regard to regulative norms of inquiry. One’s commitments must survive critical scrutiny, and if they do not survive, they should be revised. Alternately, for views to be adequately articulated and defended, their proponents must maintain a strong commitment to the views in question. A solution is proposed with the notion of holding one’s own as the virtue of being reason-responsive with the prospects of improving the view in question
Keywords Argumentative rules  Refutation  Tenacity  Falliblism
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