Synthese 163 (2):175 - 185 (2008)
|Abstract||I will assume here the defenses of epistemic infinitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that infinitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the infinitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justification, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure infinitisms. Further, I will argue that impure infinitisms have the dialectical advantage.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Andrew D. Cling (2004). The Trouble with Infinitism. Synthese 138 (1):101 - 123.
Carl Gillett (2003). Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709–717.
David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2009). Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):183-193.
John Turri (2013). Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795.
John Turri (2010). Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):275-283.
Adam C. Podlaskowski & Joshua A. Smith (2011). Infinitism and Epistemic Normativity. Synthese 178 (3):515-527.
Scott F. Aikin (2009). Prospects for Peircian Epistemic Infinitism. Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):71-89.
Jeanne Peijnenburg (2007). Infinitism Regained. Mind 116 (463):597 - 602.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads64 ( #17,310 of 722,753 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #17,032 of 722,753 )
How can I increase my downloads?