Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic infinitism

Synthese 163 (2):175 - 185 (2008)
Abstract
I will assume here the defenses of epistemic infinitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that infinitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the infinitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justification, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure infinitisms. Further, I will argue that impure infinitisms have the dialectical advantage.
Keywords Epistemology  Infinitism  Foundationalism  Regress problem
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J. Aaron Simmons & Scott F. Aikin (2012). Prospects for A Levinasian Epistemic Infinitism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (3):437-460.
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