Modest Evidentialism

Evidentialism is the view that subjects should believe neither more than nor contrary to what their current evidence supports. I will critically present two arguments for the view. A common source of resistance to evidentialism is that there are intuitive cases where subjects should believe contrary to their evidence. I will present modest evidentialism as the view that subjects should believe in accord with what their evidence supports, but that this norm may be overridden under certain conditions. As such, a modest evidentialismaccommodates the intuitions behind a good deal of traditional anti-evidentialism
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/ipq200646319
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Scott F. Aikin (2008). Holding One's Own. Argumentation 22 (4):571-584.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Allen Wood (2008). The Duty to Believe According to the Evidence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):7 - 24.
Jason Baehr (2009). Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):545-567.
Keith Derose (2000). Ought We to Follow Our Evidence? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):697-706.
Inga Nayding (2011). Conceptual Evidentialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.
Daniel M. Mittag, Evidentialism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

52 ( #64,397 of 1,725,158 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #64,836 of 1,725,158 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.