International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):327-343 (2006)
|Abstract||Evidentialism is the view that subjects should believe neither more than nor contrary to what their current evidence supports. I will critically present two arguments for the view. A common source of resistance to evidentialism is that there are intuitive cases where subjects should believe contrary to their evidence. I will present modest evidentialism as the view that subjects should believe in accord with what their evidence supports, but that this norm may be overridden under certain conditions. As such, a modest evidentialismaccommodates the intuitions behind a good deal of traditional anti-evidentialism|
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