Who is afraid of epistemology's regress problem?

Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191 - 217 (2005)
Abstract
  What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: (A) conceptual arguments from incompleteness, (B) conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, (C) ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and (D) ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of “infinitism” consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism
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References found in this work BETA
Bruce Aune (1972). Remarks on Argument by Chisholm. Philosophical Studies 23 (5):327 - 334.

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