Who is afraid of epistemology's regress problem?

Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191 - 217 (2005)
  What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: (A) conceptual arguments from incompleteness, (B) conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, (C) ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and (D) ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of “infinitism” consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.2307/4321653
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J. Aaron Simmons & Scott F. Aikin (2012). Prospects for A Levinasian Epistemic Infinitism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (3):437-460.

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