A reply to Bechtel and Mundale

Abstract
One theme in recent philosophical attention to neuroscience has been that closer, more serious attention to actual neuroscientific research, and its results, challenges the familiar view that psychological properties are multiply realized by neuroscientific properties. Shagrir, (1998), presents a number of diverse reasons to think that diversity in neuroscientifically identified structures and properties does not inevitably lead to multiple realization. Bechtel and Mundale, (1999), argue that neuroscientific practice extending over a century contradicts the consequences of the hypothesis that psychological functions are multiply realized. Bickle, (2003), argues that a series of animal models of the consolidation of short-term memories into long-term memories reveals that this process is uniquely realized by a single biochemical cascade involving cAMP, protein kinase A, and cAMP response element binding proteins. Shapiro, (2004), argues that experiments on neuroplasticity do not show that there are many ways in which a brain might be wired in order to achieve a given psychological function.
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