Defending non-derived content

Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669 (2005)
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Abstract

In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.

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Author Profiles

Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark
Fred Adams
University of Delaware

References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.

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