Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669 (2005)
|Abstract||In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality|
|Keywords||Content Derivation Intentionality Metaphysics Original Thought Dennett, Daniel|
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