Neuroscience and multiple realization: a reply to Bechtel and Mundale

Synthese 167 (3):493-510 (2009)
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Abstract

One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper challenges that argument.

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Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark

Citations of this work

Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mechanisms and Constitutive Relevance.Mark B. Couch - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):375-388.
Multiple realizability.John Bickle - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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