Representations without rules, connectionism, and the syntactic argument
Synthese 101 (3):465-92 (1994)
| Abstract | Terry Horgan and John Tienson have suggested that connectionism might provide a framework within which to articulate a theory of cognition according to which there are mental representations without rules (RWR) (Horgan and Tienson 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992). In essence, RWR states that cognition involves representations in a language of thought, but that these representations are not manipulated by the sort of rules that have traditionally been posited. In the development of RWR, Horgan and Tienson attempt to forestall a particular line of criticism, theSyntactic Argument, which would show RWR to be inconsistent with connectionism. In essence, the argument claims that the node-level rules of connectionist networks, along with the semantic interpretations assigned to patterns of activation, serve to determine a set of representation-level rules incompatible with the RWR conception of cognition. The present paper argues that the Syntactic Argument can be made to show that RWR is inconsistent with connectionism | |||||||||
| Keywords | Connectionism Epistemology Language Syntax Horgan, T Tienson, J | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesTerence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1996). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. MIT Press.
Gerard O'Brien (1998). Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content. Acta Analytica 22:111-31.
Olga Markic (1999). Connectionism and the Language of Thought: The Cross-Context Stability of Representations. Acta Analytica 22 (22):43-57.
Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1991). Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems? In S. Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theorye and Practice. Oup.
Terence Horgan & John Tienson (1997). Pr Cis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):337 – 356.
Gerard O'Brien (1989). Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content. Acta Analytica 22 (22):111-31.
Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1987). Settling Into a New Paradigm. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1):97-113.
Kenneth Aizawa (1999). Connectionist Rules: A Rejoinder to Horgan and Tienson's Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Acta Analytica 22 (22):59-85.
Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1989). Representation Without Rules. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):147-74.
Marcello Guarini (2001). A Defence of Connectionism Against the "Syntactic" Argument. Synthese 128 (3):287-317.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads39 ( #29,813 of 549,084 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,333 of 549,084 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
