Curry's paradox in contractionless constructive logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):135 - 150 (1996)
We propose contractionless constructive logic which is obtained from Nelson's constructive logic by deleting contractions. We discuss the consistency of a naive set theory based on the proposed logic in relation to Curry's paradox. The philosophical significance of contractionless constructive logic is also argued in comparison with Fitch's and Prawitz's systems
Keywords Curry's paradox  contractionless constructive logic  naive set theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00247001
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Susan Rogerson (2007). Natural Deduction and Curry's Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):155 - 179.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

24 ( #122,515 of 1,725,260 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #110,379 of 1,725,260 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.