Online research in philosophy

ch. 1. Conscience--the subjective norm of morality -- ch. 2. Conscience and law -- ch. 3. Relationship between conscience and law -- ch. 4. Holy Scipture on the nature of conscience -- ch. 5. Freedom and commitment of conscience -- ch. 6. The African and conscience with particular reference to the Igbos of Nigeria -- ch. 7. Igbo moral conscience in the light of cross-cultural education: Western civilisation and christianity.

Foreword This small volume contains two essays on conscience by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, written while he was Prefect of the ...

I argue here that the centeredness of human experience as human is misrepresented by ecocentrists as identical with (or the cause of) human chauvinism, and that although centeredness describes an ineradicable feature of human consciousness, nothing necessarily follows from it other than what follows from any unique configuration of capacities and limitations. Appealing to the ways in which we use anthropomorphizing language, I argue that at the root of this misrepresentation is a failure to take seriously not only the perceptual and epistemic centeredness of human experience, but the ways in which gendered and heterosexualized social norms have become naturalized among its features. Restoring human-centeredness to environmental conscience requires becoming clear about how centeredness is realized not only as chauvinism, but as heterosexism—not because any necessity governs this history, but because what makes enduring change possible is the development of an environmental conscience equally committed to the struggle for social justice.

The essays in this book mark the tercentenary of the birth of Bishop Joseph Butler, the leading Anglican theologian of the eighteenth century and also an important moral philosopher. They cover the full range of Butler's theological and philosophical writings--from his Christian apologetic against the deists to his discussion of the role of their historical context and suggestion of their relevance to contemporary religious and philosophical issues. At a time of renewed interest in Butler's thought, as well as in the theological positions he was opposing, it is timely and appropriate that these detailed studies of Butler's thought should now be made available.

This essay considers eighteenth-century Anglican thinker Joseph Butler's view of the role of natural emotions in moral reasoning and action. Emotions such as compassion and resentment are shown to play a positive role in the moral life by motivating action and by directing agents toward certain good objects—for example, relief of misery and justice. For Butler, moral virtue is present when these natural affections are kept in proper proportion by the "superior" principles of the moral life—conscience, self-love, and benevolence—which involve the capacity for reasonable reflection. For contemporary thinkers, Butler's approach suggests that natural emotion should not be viewed as the enemy of moral reasoning; in fact, it challenges ethicists to pay attention to and account for the significant role of the emotions in the moral life.

The eclipse of interest in Joseph Butler's analysis of the relation of conscience and action and the dismissal of his ethics on the grounds that the argument is flawed by circularity and/or the naturalistic fallacy are both a consequence of the failure of scholars to attend to the complex design of his work considered as a whole. The seldom studied Sermon XV is pivotal to understanding Butler's conception of failure and possibility. While it builds on the familiar arguments of Sermons I-III, the last sermon sets aside the analogy of the watch to explore the problem of virtue in light of Old Testament wisdom narratives that establish the vanity of human endeavor and the limitations of the human condition. Sermon XV not only alters our reading of those that precede it but also binds Butler's reflections on ethics to his later reflections on religious truth.