Logic and Truth

Abstract
It is usually held that what distinguishes a good inference from a bad one is that a good inference is truth-preserving. Against this view, this paper argues that a logical inference is good or bad depending not on whether it is truth-preserving or not, but whether it belongs to a logical system the addition of which makes a deductively conservative extension of the derivation relations among the atomic statements. To so argue, the paper first contends that the meaning of the logical operators of classical logic is determined not by their connections to truth, but by their inferential roles. It is claimed in conclusion that there is no genuine issue over which logic, classical or intuitionistic, is the correct logic, for they are both conservative in the relevant sense
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,793
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Kevin C. Klement, Propositional Logic. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
G. B. Keene (1995). The Psychology-Logic Overlap. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):57 - 62.
Theodore Hailperin (1991). Probability Logic in the Twentieth Century. History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (1):71-110.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-12-02

Total downloads

12 ( #132,704 of 1,099,722 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #186,613 of 1,099,722 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.