Lost the plot? Reconstructing Dennett's multiple drafts theory of consciousness

Mind and Language 11 (1):1-43 (1996)
Abstract
: In Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett presents the Multiple Drafts Theory of consciousness, a very brief, largely empirical theory of brain function. From these premises, he draws a number of quite radical conclusions—for example, the conclusion that conscious events have no determinate time of occurrence. The problem, as many readers have pointed out, is that there is little discernible route from the empirical premises to the philosophical conclusions. In this article, I try to reconstruct Dennett's argument, providing both the philosophical views behind the empirical premises, and the hidden empirical arguments behind the derivation of the philosophical conclusions
Keywords Brain  Color  Consciousness  Empiricism  Epistemology  Model  Dennett, D
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00027.x
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References found in this work BETA
Adina L. Roskies & C. C. Wood (1992). Cinema 1-2-Many of the Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):221-223.
Antonio R. Damasio (1992). The Selfless Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):208-209.

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