Is there a true metaphysics of material objects?

Philosophical Issues 12 (1):118-145 (2002)
Abstract
I argue (1) that metaphysical views of material objects should be understood as 'packages', rather than individual claims, where the other parts of the package include how the theory addresses 'recalcitant data' (such as - the denier of artifacts has to account, somehow, for the seeming truth of 'there are three pencils on my table'), and (2) that when the packages meet certain general desiderata - which all of the currently competing views *can* meet - there is nothing in the world that could make one of the theories true as opposed to any of the others.
Keywords material objects, verbal dispute, metaontology
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References found in this work BETA
W. R. Carter (1997). Dion's Left Foot (and the Price of Burkean Economy). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):371-379.

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Citations of this work BETA
Ross P. Cameron (2007). The Contingency of Composition. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):99-121.
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Kantian Monism. Philosophical Papers 41 (1):23-56.

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