Is there a true metaphysics of material objects?

Philosophical Issues 12 (1):118-145 (2002)
I argue (1) that metaphysical views of material objects should be understood as 'packages', rather than individual claims, where the other parts of the package include how the theory addresses 'recalcitant data' (such as - the denier of artifacts has to account, somehow, for the seeming truth of 'there are three pencils on my table'), and (2) that when the packages meet certain general desiderata - which all of the currently competing views *can* meet - there is nothing in the world that could make one of the theories true as opposed to any of the others.
Keywords material objects, verbal dispute, metaontology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1758-2237.2002.tb00064.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Ned Markosian (1998). Brutal Composition. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211-249.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Ross P. Cameron (2007). The Contingency of Composition. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):99-121.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

126 ( #16,783 of 1,725,169 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

15 ( #48,689 of 1,725,169 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.