Philo 8 (2):95-108 (2005)
|Abstract||In this paper I argue that Robert Kane’s defense of event-causal libertarianism, as presented in Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent. I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense|
|Keywords||Free Will Indeterminism Libertarianism Metaphysics Kane, Robert|
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