Robert Kane, Free Will and Neuro-Indeterminism

Philo 8 (2):95-108 (2005)
Abstract
In this paper I argue that Robert Kane’s defense of event-causal libertarianism, as presented in Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent. I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,392
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Ken Levy (2001). The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.
Michael M. Pitman (2012). Freedom, Indeterminism and Imagination. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):369-383.
Robert H. Kane (2002). Free Will, Determinism, and Indeterminism. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic. 371--406.
Galen Strawson (2000). Review: The Unhelpfulness of Indeterminism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):149 - 155.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-01-09

Total downloads

23 ( #76,425 of 1,102,917 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #84,702 of 1,102,917 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.