The propensity theory: A decision-theoretic restatement

Synthese 156 (3):587 - 603 (2007)
  Probability theory is important because of its relevance for decision making, which also means: its relevance for the single case. The propensity theory of objective probability, which addresses the single case, is subject to two problems: Humphreys’ problem of inverse probabilities and the problem of the reference class. The paper solves both problems by restating the propensity theory using (an objectivist version of) Pearl’s approach to causality and probability, and by applying a decision-theoretic perspective. Contrary to a widely held view, decision making on the basis of given propensities can proceed without a subjective-probability supplement to propensities
Keywords Causality  Decision theory  Humphreys’ problem  Probability  Reference class problem  Propensity interpretation
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DOI 10.2307/27653535
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References found in this work BETA
Deborah G. Mayo (2001). Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Donald Gillies (2000). Varieties of Propensity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835.

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