Online research in philosophy

This book offers a defense of the tensed theory of time, a critique of the New Theory of Reference, and an argument that simultaneity is absolute. Although Smith rejects ordinary language philosophy, he shows how it is possible to argue from the nature of language to the nature of reality. Specifically, he argues that semantic properties of tensed sentences are best explained by the hypothesis that they ascribe to events temporal properties of futurity, presentness, or pastness and do not merely ascribe relations of earlier than or simultaneity. He criticizes the New Theory of Reference, which holds that "now" refers directly to a time and does not ascribe the property of presentness. Smith does not adopt the old or Fregean theory of reference but develops a third alternative, based on his detailed theory of de re and de dicto propositions and a theory of cognitive significance. He concludes the book with a lengthy critique of Einstein's theory of time. Smith offers a positive argument for absolute simultaneity based on his theory that all propositions exist in time. He shows how Einstein's relativist temporal concepts are reducible to a conjunction of absolutist temporal concepts and relativist nontemporal concepts of the observable behavior of light rays, rigid bodies, and the like.

This chapter considers various factors that have been responsible for the comparatively slow development of psychology into a cumulative empirical science. Special attention is devoted to correctable methodological mistakes, the over-reliance upon significance testing (and the fact that, in psychology, the null hypothesis is almost always false), and an analysis of the concept of replication.

The three syntheses of time are Deleuze’s response to Kant’s belief that time is synthesized by the unity o the “I think.” Deleuze believes that there is a prior synthesis of time in the unconscious. He calls this a “passive” synthesis of time. My thesis will seek to clarify Deleuze’s theory of the three syntheses of time by providing the background from which he derived his concepts. In chapter one I argue that the system of “signs” presented in Proust and Signs is the precursor to Deleuze’s three syntheses of time. I conclude that Worldy Signs correspond to synthesis of habit, Signs of Love correspond to the synthesis of memory, and Signs of Art correspond to the synthesis of the future. In chapter two I argue that the system of “series” presented in the second half of The Logic of Sense illustrates Deleuze’s conceptions of “resonance” and “forced movement” that are critical to understanding the three syntheses of time. I conclude that Deleuze’s conception of connective, conjunctive and disjunctive series are derived from Freud’s reading of libidinal stages in his Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality. In chapter three I argue that chapter two of Difference and Repetition is based upon concepts derived from Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology. I conclude that the concepts of the Id, Ego and Superego each correspond to a synthesis of time and that these agencies are primarily based upon neurological processes. In chapter four I argue that the static repetitions are the means by which the three syntheses of time manifest themselves in our actions. I conclude that the Superego presents and forbids actions that constitute a “pure event” and that the psyche reacts by repetitive behaviours that correspond to the three static dimensions of time: the before, the during, and the after.

Are people free and morally responsible? Or are their actions determined, i.e. inevitable outcomes of the past conditions and the laws of nature? These seem fairly straightforward questions, but it is important to distinguish 3 different dimensions of the free will debate: a descriptive project, a substantive project, and a prescriptive project. In this chapter, I’ll consider how psychology can contribute to each project in turn. First, I should say a bit more about the projects.

In “Can the New Tenseless Theory of Time be Saved by Individual Essences?” Smith objects to the co-reporting theory on the groundsthat, since it grants that every time “now” is tokened it expresses a unique individual essence of that time which can be apprehended only at that time, the co-reporting theory is consistent with an A-theory of time that holds that each moment of time acquires its own particular property of presentness. I argue that Smith’s conclusion does not follow, since moments of time have world-indexed properties which, though distinct from the individual essences ascribed to them by the use of “now,” are expressible by the use ofdate-expressions.

Machine generated contents note: Chapter 1 -- The Prison of the Known -- Chapter 2 -- Can We Live without Conflict? -- Chapter 3 -- The Meaning of Dialogue -- Chapter 4 -- Practice and Solidarity: We Are the World -- Chapter 5 -- Science and the Religious Mind -- Chapter 6 -- A Call for Active Being: Being at Home in the World.

B. F. Skinner's "The Behavior of Organisms" (1938/1966) and "Walden Two" (1948) are both positivistic. Skinner explicitly stated his approach was positivistic in "The Behavior of Organisms" although he did not make an explicit statement about "Walden Two". Three features of positivism are elaborated—its concern with indisputable certitude, unified reality, and ever-onward progress, each of which entailed overly simplifying assumptions. These features are brought out in the positivistic sources for "Walden Two" and in the changes from the positivistic views of Frazier, the protagonist in "Walden Two", to Skinner's later pragmatic-selectionist views.

The debate between A-theory and B-theory in the philosophy of time is a persistent one. It is not always clear, however, what the terms of this debate are. A-theorists are often lumped with a miscellaneous collection of heterodox doctrines: the view that only the present exists, that time flows relentlessly, or that presentness is a property (Williams 1996); that time passes, tense is unanalysable, or that earlier than and later than are defined in terms of pastness, presentness, and futurity (Bigelow 1991); or that events or facts (as opposed to language) are “tensed” (Mellor 1993). B-theorists then argue that the A-theory is incoherent, using variants on J.M.E. McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time (McTaggart 1927, ch. 33).

presentness is a relational property, then this theory is compatible with STR but inconsistent with the tensed theory of time (the theory of objective time flow). But if presentness is a monadic property, the..