Online research in philosophy

In this article, I will explore an idea of authority as depicted by a religious picture (note the indefinite article). It is a picture, not the picture. It is the picture of God as the supreme decision maker without him being a deliberator. I shall call it the decisionist picture of God. His authority is based on his absolute will unhindered by any laws and rules and in particular by any laws of morality. One may call the decisionist picture of God a fascist picture of God. This is perhaps abusive but not inaccurate. 'That there must be', in the language of the 18th century Blackstone, 'a supreme, irresistible, absolute, and uncontrolled authority, in which the … right of sovereignty resides', is the idea and ideal that I am interested in. Pompously put, it is the genealogy of authority that I am interested in.

v. 1. Mathematical expression of the main categories of philosophy and logic -- Kinematics and dynamics of exchange -- v. 2. Structure of space of the universe -- electrostatic and electromagnetic fields -- Particles and exchange in the electromagnetic field -- v. 3. Atomic structure of matter-space-time and physical properties of substance -- Physics and philosophy.

General Relativity offers the possibility to model attributes of matter, like mass, momentum, angular momentum, spin, chirality etc. from pure space, endowed only with a single field that represents its Riemannian geometry. I review this picture of `Geometrodynamics' and comment on various developments after Einstein.

A picture of the world as chiefly one of discrete objects, distributed in space and time, has sometimes seemed compelling. It is however one of the main targets of Henry Laycock's book; for it is seriously incomplete. The picture, he argues, leaves no space for "stuff" like air and water. With discrete objects, we may always ask "how many?," but with stuff the question has to be "how much?" Laycock's fascinating exploration also addresses key logical and linguistic questions about the way we categorize the many and the much.

Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space . Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers’s account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based on Priest’s notion of open worlds yet which contains only those epistemic scenarios which are not obviously impossible. Whether something is obvious is not always a determinate matter and so the resulting picture is of an epistemic space with fuzzy boundaries.

In this essay I start by telling the strange story of a painter and of his picture. The story, I argue, invites questions about artistic space that could be productively asked of 'legal space' too - the space that each legal theory and practice, each time and in different ways, institutes and rules. What, the story asks, is to think legal space? Where do the origins of legal space lie? In short, how is the heartland of legal space? How for example is the heartland of 'contract', 'murder', 'citizenship' or 'war'? Such questions - as it will be apparent to anyone interested in today's most troubling debates over the future of the nation states and of the rule of law - are of considerable importance and should not be ignored by a genuinely imaginative legal scholarship.

While the Phase Space formulation of quantum mechanics has received considerable attention it has seldom been defended as a viable interpretation. In this paper I expound the Phase Space Picture, use it to provide a quasi-classical ‘hidden variables’ interpretation of quantum mechanics and offer a defence of it against various objections.