Expectations and Choiceworthiness

Mind 120 (479):803-817 (2011)
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Abstract

The Pasadena game is an example of a decision problem which lacks an expected value, as traditionally conceived. Easwaran (2008) has shown that, if we distinguish between two different kinds of expectations, which he calls ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, the Pasadena game lacks a strong expectation but has a weak expectation. Furthermore, he argues that we should use the weak expectation as providing a measure of the value of an individual play of the Pasadena game. By considering a modified version of the Pasadena game, I argue that weak expectations may provide a very poor measure of the value of an individual play of the game, and hence should not be used to value individual plays unless further information is taken into consideration

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Jason Alexander
London School of Economics

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References found in this work

Vexing expectations.Harris Nover & Alan Hájek - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):237-249.
Strong and weak expectations.Kenny Easwaran - 2008 - Mind 117 (467):633-641.

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