Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat
Philosophia 40 (3):497-521 (2012)
| Abstract | Inferential Internalists accept the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ), according to which one has justification for believing P on the basis of E only if one has justification for believing that E makes probable P. Richard Fumerton has defended PIJ by appeal to examples, and recently Adam Leite has argued that this principle is supported by considerations regarding the nature of responsible belief. In this paper, I defend a form of externalism against both arguments. This form of externalism recognizes what I call the phenomenon of reflective defeat: if one is justified in not believing that E makes probable P, then this defeats whatever justification one has for believing P upon the basis of E. I argue that this modified version of externalism has the virtue of accommodating the intuitions that motivate internalism, without the cost of the vicious regress that makes internalism so unattractive. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesDavid J. Alexander (2012). Weak Inferential Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
M. Huemer (2002). Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:329--340.
David J. Alexander (2012). Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable From Externalism – A Reply to Rhoda. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:387-394.
Adam Leite (2008). Believing One's Reasons Are Good. Synthese 161 (3):419 - 441.
Alan R. Rhoda (2008). Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification, Skepticism, and the Nature of Inference. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:215-234.
John Gibbons (2006). Access Externalism. Mind 115 (457):19-39.
Michael Bergmann (2000). Deontology and Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
Sven Bernecker (2006). Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.
Nathan Hanna (2011). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). The Rational Roles of Intuition. In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
Anthony Brueckner (2011). Justification, Internalism, and Cream Cheese. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):13-20.
Gregory W. Dawes (2012). Justified Believing:Avoiding the Paradox. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
Declan Smithies (2012). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
John Greco (1990). Internalism and Epistemically Responsible Belief. Synthese 85 (2):245 - 277.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-12-12Total downloads21 ( #58,746 of 549,092 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,333 of 549,092 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
