Making models count

Philosophy of Science 75 (3):383-404 (2008)
What sort of claims do scientific models make and how do these claims then underwrite empirical successes such as explanations and reliable policy interventions? In this paper I propose answers to these questions for the class of models used throughout the social and biological sciences, namely idealized deductive ones with a causal interpretation. I argue that the two main existing accounts misrepresent how these models are actually used, and propose a new account. *Received July 2006; revised August 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall (MC 73), One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400; e-mail:
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DOI 10.1086/592952
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Weisberg (2006). Robustness Analysis. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):730-742.

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Citations of this work BETA
Julian Reiss (2012). The Explanation Paradox. Journal of Economic Methodology 19 (1):43-62.
John Symons & Jack Horner (2014). Software Intensive Science. Philosophy and Technology 27 (3):461-477.

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