Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):337-341 (2009)
In chapter 8 of Miller 2003, I argued against the idea that Jackson and Pettit's notion of program explanation might help Sturgeon's non-reductive naturalist version of moral realism respond to the explanatory challenge posed by Harman. In a recent paper in the AJP[Nelson 2006, Mark Nelson has attempted to defend the idea that program explanation might prove useful to Sturgeon in replying to Harman. In this note, I suggest that Nelson's argument fails
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E. J. Lowe (1995). The Truth About Counterfactuals. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):41-59.

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