Sweatshops, Context Differentiation, and the Rational Person Standard
Philosophy in the Contemporary World 18 (1):68-74 (2011)
| Abstract | In making decisions regardmg what to do, people should employ plausible moral standards to defend what they think is morally permissible. One plausible moral standard that is often used is what I refer to as the Rational Person Standard: we, as rational agents, ought to choose the option that has the greatest benefit for us, under the constraint that what we choose does not unfairly limit other people from choosing what they think is best for them. Another way to phrase this standard is: rational agents will not choose an action that will cause uimecessary and avoidable harm. In this paper I will apply this standard to an analysis of a systemic issue common to many moral problems, using sweatshops as an example, that, if ignored, may lead us to make, and act upon, arguments that seem plausible in one context, but ultimately fail when considered from another context | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesRichard O'Neil (1983). Determining Proxy Consent. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 8 (4):389-403.
Bruno Verbeek (2008). Consequentialism and Rational Choice: Lessons From the Allais Paradox. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116.
Thomas L. Carson (2013). Free Exchange for Mutual Benefit: Sweatshops and Maitland's “Classical Liberal Standard”. Journal of Business Ethics 112 (1):127-135.
Paul Noordhof (1999). Moral Requirements Are Still Not Rational Requirements. Analysis 59 (3):127–136.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2011). First-Personal Aspects of Agency. Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.
Valerie Tiberius (2002). Practical Reason and the Stability Standard. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):339-354.
Ronald M. Green (1974). Conferred Rights and the Fetus. Journal of Religious Ethics 2 (1):55 - 75.
Paul Hurley (2009). Beyond Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
Paul Hurley (2009). Beyond Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
Jyl Gentzler (2012). How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4).
David Copp (2005). The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):165-203.
Igor Douven (2002). A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.
Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Temptation and Deliberation. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):583 - 606.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2012-03-18Total downloads4 ( #180,404 of 556,837 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,837 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
