Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable from Externalism – A Reply to Rhoda
Journal of Philosophical Research 37:387-394 (2012)
| Abstract | In “Weak Inferential Internalism” I defended the frequently voiced criticism that any internalist account of inferential justification generates a vicious regress. My defense involved criticizing a recent form of internalism, “Weak Inferential Internalism” (WII) defended by Hookway and Rhoda. I argued that while WII does not generate a vicious regress, the position is only distinguishable from externalism insofar as it makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reason. Either way, WII is not a defensible internalist account of inferential justification. In his “In Defense of Weak Inferential Internalism,” Rhoda has responded to my dilemma argument. He argues that it is mistaken to assume that WII must be incompatible with externalism, and that contrary to my claims, WII is distinguishable from externalism in several ways. In this reply, I explain why none of Rhoda’s replies suggest that there is a defensible internalist account of inferential justification. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,664 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesDavid J. Alexander (2012). Weak Inferential Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
David J. Alexander (2012). Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat. Philosophia 40 (3):497-521.
B. J. C. Madison (2009). On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism. Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
Patrice Philie (2007). Carroll's Regress and the Epistemology of Logic. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):183 - 210.
Alan R. Rhoda (2008). Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification, Skepticism, and the Nature of Inference. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:215-234.
Daniel Cohnitz & Jussi Haukioja (2012). Meta-Externalism Vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (iFirst):1-26.
Sven Bernecker (2006). Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.
Ali Hasan (2011). Classical Foundationalism and Bergmann's Dilemma for Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:391-410.
Adam Leite (2008). Believing One's Reasons Are Good. Synthese 161 (3):419 - 441.
John Gibbons (2006). Access Externalism. Mind 115 (457):19-39.
Elinor Mason (2008). An Argument Against Motivational Internalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.
Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
Chris Tillman (2012). Reconciling Justificatory Internalism and Content Externalism. Synthese 187 (2):419-440.
Thomas M. Crisp (2010). A Dilemma for Internalism? Synthese 174 (3).
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-12-13Total downloads17 ( #70,994 of 548,999 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,320 of 548,999 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
