Online research in philosophy

Questions about information inform many debates in bioethics. One of the reasons for this is that at least some level of information is taken by many to be a prerequisite of valid consent. For others, autonomy in the widest sense presupposes information, because one cannot be in control of one’s life without at least some insight into what it could turn out to contain. Yet not everyone shares this view, and there is a debate about whether or not there is a right to remain in ignorance of one’s medical, and especially genetic, information. It is notable, though, that this debate leaves unexamined the assumption that, if a person wants information, he is entitled to it. This paper examines the assumption, specifically in relation to genetics, where learning facts about oneself may reveal facts about other people, particularly one’s close relatives. This may be taken as a violation of their privacy, and since privacy is something that we normally think should be respected, it is worth asking whether one ought to abjure the opportunity to obtain genetic information for the sake of privacy. In effect, there may be an argument to be made not just for a right to remain in ignorance, but for a duty to do so.

As computer-based information systems start to have a great impact on people, organizations, and society as a whole, there is much debate about information technology in relation to social control and privacy, security and reliability, and ethics and professional responsibilities. However, more often than not, these debates reveal some fundamental disagreements, sometimes about first principles. In this article the authors suggest that a fruitful and interesting way to conceptualize some of these moral and ethical issues associated with the use of information technology is to apply the principles of Aristotle's ethics to this topic. They argue that framing the moral and ethical choices associated with information technology in Aristotelian terms draws attention to the fact that there are fundamental dilemmas to be addressed. These dilemmas are discussed in relation to the four areas suggested by Dejoie, Fowler, and Paradice (1991): (a) privacy, (b) information accuracy, (c) access to information, and (d) intellectual property rights. The dilemmas associated with all four areas are illustrated with references to recent legal developments in Australia and New Zealand.

This paper is an investigation of the relation between personal and social conditions of knowledge. A coherence theory of knowledge and justification is assumed, according to which incoming information is evaluated in terms of background information. The evaluation of incoming information in terms of background information is a higher order or metamental activity. Personal knowledge and justification is based on the coherent integration of individual information. Social knowledge and justification is based on the coherent aggregation of social information, that is, the information of individuals belonging to the social group. Personal justification and consensual justification are based upon personal and consensual probabilities respectively. Consensual and personal probabilities may differ, but under salient conditions personal probabilities will coincide with consensual probabilities and consensual probabilities will coincide with truth.

Readers of previous installments of this column will recall that I have been discussing both the general relationship between information practices and moral virtues and some specific questions about the effects of information technology, such as the "expert system," upon our ability to lead virtuous lives and have morally satisfying work. In this column, I want to take a practical turn by articulating some of the ethical considerations which might motivate workplace information policy.

Most of the debate about online social networking sites, such as Facebook, has thus far revolved around questions of privacy and access to personal information. Users of such services, should they choose to exercise them, have a myriad of privacy options that allow them to restrict access to their own personal information posted online, and the privacy policies of such sites are abundantly clear that the making of such choices is the responsibility of the Users themselves. However, due to the focus resting upon these peer-to-peer privacy questions, those relating to the service provider-to-User relationship have been overlooked. This paper seeks to highlight some of the more subtle privacy issues of (what we will call) the ‘Facebook debate’ in terms of two main considerations: the access to and the control of personal information posted online.

We analyse the contention that privacy is an alien concept within Japanese society, put forward in various presentations of Japanese cultural norms at least as far back as Benedict in The chrysanthemum and the sword: patterns of Japanese culture. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1946. In this paper we distinguish between information privacy and physical privacy. As we show, there is good evidence for social norms of limits on the sharing and use of personal information (i.e. information privacy) from traditional interactions in Japanese society, as well as constitutional evidence from the late 19th century (in the Meiji Constitution of 1889). In this context the growing awareness of the Japanese public about problems with networked information processing by public sector and commercial organisations from the 1980s (when a law governing public sector use of personal information was first passed) to recent years (when that law was updated and a first law governing commercial use of personal information was adopted) are not the imposition or adoption of foreign practices nor solely an attempt to lead Japanese society into coherence with the rest of the OECD. Instead they are drawing on the experience of the rest of the developed world in developing legal responses to the breakdown of social norms governing interchange and use of personal information, stressed by the architectural changes wrought by networked information processing capabilities. This claim is supported by consideration of standard models of Japanese social interactions as well as of Supreme Court judgements declaring reasonable expectations of protection of privacy to hold in Japan.

The theories of information ethics articulated by Luciano Floridi and his collaborators have clear implications for law. Information law, including the law of privacy and of intellectual property, is especially likely to benefit from a coherent and comprehensive theory of information ethics. This article illustrates how information ethics might apply to legal doctrine, by examining legal questions related to the ownership and control of the personal data representations, including photographs, game avatars, and consumer profiles, that have become ubiquitous with the proliferation of information and communication technologies. Recent controversy over the control of player performance statistics in “fantasy” sports leagues provides a limiting case for the analysis. Such data representations will in many instances constitute the kind of personal data that information ethics asserts constitutes an information entity. Legal doctrine in some instances proves sympathetic to such an assertion, but remains largely inchoate as to which data might constitute a given information entity in a given instance. Neither is information ethics, in its current state of development, entirely helpful in answering this critical question. While information ethics holds some promise to bring coherence to this area of the law, further work articulating a richer theory of information ethics will be necessary before it can do so.

James Rachels’ seminal paper “ Why Privacy Is Important ” (1975) remains one of the most influential statements on the topic. It offers a general theory that explains why privacy is important in relation to mundane personal information and situations. According to the theory, privacy is important because it allows us to selectively disclose personal information and to engage in behaviors appropriate to and necessary for creating and maintaining diverse personal relationships. Without this control, it is implied, the diversity of relationships would diminish; relationships would “flatten out”, we might say. The aspect of the paper that addresses information flows (what I refer to as his information privacy theory) has been of particular interest to computer information privacy theorists. Despite its continued importance to computer privacy theorists, however, the information privacy theory appears to be contradicted by recent developments in computing. In particular, since the publication of Rachels’ paper we have seen an extensive amount of personal information collected. Further, recent developments in computing falling under the heading of social computing have brought about a new wave of personal information creation and collection. This paper will reassess and resituate Rachels’ information privacy theory in light of these developments. I will argue that the increasing collection of personal data will not flatten relationships as the information privacy theory predicts because such data lack contextual factors important to Rachels’ general theory. The paper will conclude by pointing to some areas where Rachels’ general theory and where his information privacy theory will continue to be relevant.

The booming popularity of the Internet, and particularly increasing use of personal Web sites, social networking sites, and blogging, raises questions regarding the ethical use of psychology graduate students' personal online information for academic purposes. Given rising controversies such as use of such information to screen applicants, I refer to the principles and standards of the Ethics Code of the American Psychological Association (2002) to examine ethical concerns associated with graduate students' personal information on the Internet, namely, the protection of privacy, use of informed consent, consideration of autonomy, and implications for students' clinical work. Finally, I make several recommendations for graduate training faculty and graduate students as they consider placing and using information on and from the Internet.

Three of the major issues in information ethics – intellectual property, speech regulation, and privacy – concern the morality of restricting peoples access to certain information. Consequently, policies in these areas have a significant impact on the amount and types of knowledge that people acquire. As a result, epistemic considerations are critical to the ethics of information policy decisions (cf. Mill, 1978 [1859]). The fact that information ethics is a part of the philosophy of information highlights this important connection with epistemology. In this paper, I illustrate how a value-theoretic approach to epistemology can help to clarify these major issues in information ethics. However, I also identify several open questions about epistemic values that need to be answered before we will be able to evaluate the epistemic consequences of many information policies.