Abstract

The naturalistic theory of mind that arises from ethology is faced with the question of continuity between human mind and animal mind. In particular, the applicability of intentional, mentalistic terms to animals arises. I argue that cognitive ethologists can and should operate with a realistic conception of intentional states in animals. ;I start by considering arguments claiming to show that the attribution of intentional states presents special difficulties in the case of animals, because the contents of such states cannot be specified. I argue that this claim is not well-supported. ;After defending against these attacks on the attribution of intentional states to animals, I develop the positive thesis that the evolutionary concerns of cognitive ethology require the use of intentional descriptions. I argue that natural selection operates on the intentional properties of organisms, and that a full evolutionary account therefore requires the attribution of the intentional states. I illustrate this in detail, using examples of ethological research on vervet monkeys. ;This leads me to discuss how biologists have made use of intentional concepts and I specifically describe some influential work on communication. In this work, biologists have attempted to give a non-intentional characterization of communication. I discuss why such approaches fail, again raising the issue of the importance of intentional descriptions for evolutionary explanations. ;I conclude by discussing consequences of my view for designing ethological experiments. I suggest that ethologists can divide their task into two parts. Evidence for complex intentional states in animals can be obtained separately from evidence that supports particular content attributions