Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273 (2013)
This paper presents an ‘over-representational’ account of blurred visual experiences. The basic idea is that blurred experiences provide too much, inconsistent, information about objects’ spatial boundaries, by representing them as simultaneously located at multiple locations. This account attempts to avoid problems with alternative accounts of blurred experience, according to which blur is a property of a visual field, a way of perceiving, a form of mis-representation, and a form of under-representation.
Keywords Blurred vision  Perception  Transparency  Intentionalism  Representationalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9758-6
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Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

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