Online research in philosophy

The requirements of education at Lagos. 15 Apr. 1892.--Primary, elementary, secondary, and supplementary education. 22 Jan. 1902.--Christian marriage. 26 May 1909.--Religious instruction in church schools. 28 May 1909.--Education of women. 18 May 1911.--The Rt. Rev. Bishop James Johnson, M.A., D.D. 1918.--The problems of education in Southern Nigeria. 9 Nov. 1920.--Our religion and our social life. 2 Oct. 1923.--Moral character. 5 July 1924.--The truth about my background and my career. 1924.--Religion as the basis of education. 1934.--Overseas scholarships for deserving Nigerian youths. 3 Dec. 1935.

Abstract Religion is a disputed area in relation to both morality and politics. Similarly, while some argue that moral education should be based on a preferred religious reference point, others reject this as categorically wrong. Both these views are false, because based on a selective perception of the universal human context, a tendency also evident in other spheres. Typically, there are three constitutional responses to religion ? established singularity, secular pluralism and selective consensus ? each with its own consequences for moral education. To be effective, moral education must take cognisance of religion in each national context. In England and Wales, the recent Education Reform Act provides a framework for both religious and moral education that is attentive to secular and multi?faith reference points, as well as those specifically Christian. Nagging doubts over religion's threat to the autonomy of ethics can be removed, given recognition of the place of reason as a common ingredient in particular religious traditions and in the response of individuals within them. Moral education and political life alike should look to this source for enrichment and renewal.

Abstract In a recent paper Richard Barrett criticises Solomon (and the so?called cognitivists in general) for dismissing irrational emotions as marginal and atypical. This paper argues that Barrett's criticism is unwarranted. Two explanations are suggested for his misconception of Solomon's view (and, more generally, of the cognitive view) on irrational emotions. First, Barrett mistakenly conceives the reconciliation of emotion and reason as a conciliation of emotion and rationality in an evaluative or normative sense. Secondly, Barrett disregards the difference between the cognitive conception of (ir)rationality and his own definition of (ir)rationality in terms of coping. Some implications of the argument for the education of (moral) emotions are spelled out.

Emotion is always someone's. An emotion is also, at least typically, about something and witnesses the value, or lack of value, in it. Some emotions, such as shame and pride, are actually about the self that has them. But self-concern can insinuate itself into every corner of the emotional life. This occurs when the centre of concern in emotion drifts from the ostensible objects of focus (I was sorry to hear your bad news) to the emotion itself, to the drama of it, to its feel, to the fact that one is having it. In an unobvious way, the world becomes backdrop, the self the omnipresent protagonist. The apparent ordering, the natural ordering of subject and object in emotion, is inverted. Emotion undergoes a kind of commodification. Yet this is paradoxical. For it isolates the self and subverts the communication and uptake of emotion by others. Narcissism is inimical to the social character of emotion.

Abstract The fact of the logical distinction between religion and morality is taken in some circles as implying and even requiring a necessary conflict between their respective aims and objectives. Consequently, it has been proposed that moral education must be kept completely separate from religious education. Such a separation, it has been argued, is necessary in order to ensure, among other things, the development of truly rational and autonomous moral agents. It is, however, argued here that although morality is logically independent of religion, certain religious beliefs and practices provide strong psychological incentives which may be effectively employed in the service of moral education. This thesis is supported by the historical experience of Ancient Israel as well as the findings of empirical researchers who have investigated the nature of the relationship between religion and morals.

This article analyses the concept of ?aesthetic emotion? in John Dewey's Art as experience. The analysis shows that Dewey's line of investigation offers valuable insights as to the role of emotion in experience: it shows emotion as an integral part and structuring force, as a cultural and historical category. However, the notion of aesthetic emotion is characterized by a fundamental ambiguity. There is a conflict between a mechanical and an organic understanding of emotion, a confusion of emotion as structure and of emotion as process, of emotion as content and as agency. The central problem may consist of the conception of aesthetic experience as the ideal. While evil and despair are thereby excluded from the art, everyday life is left wanting, as it cannot live up to the ideal.

Abstract Robert Solomon, a philosopher noted for arguing the conciliation of reason and emotion, holds that emotions which are a lapse from rationality are unimportant. Their importance is supported here. Emotional habits of discourse, as well as of action, are discussed, unlike in most treatments of reason and emotion. The implication for cognitive and moral education is that the ability to engage in rational discussion, and the discipline to maintain application to difficult tasks, are seen as potentially curtailed by emotional habits of evasion. Comments are added to contest the decisiveness of the main argument used to reconcile reason and emotion, that is, the analysis of emotions as having a cognitive element.

Reason in the emotional life. I-III.--Education of the emotions.--The early discipline of personality.--The personal life.--The virtue of chastity.--Art and the future.--Science and religion.--Reason and religion.--Religious reality.--The maturity of religion. I-II.--The conservation of personality.