David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):63-74 (1994)
Social play is naturally characterized in intentional terms. An evolutionary account of social play could help scientists to understand the evolution of cognition and intentionality. Alexander Rosenberg (1990) has argued that if play is characterized intentionally or functionally, it is not a behavioral phenotype suitable for evolutionary explanation. If he is right, his arguments would threaten many projects in cognitive ethology. We argue that Rosenberg's arguments are unsound and that intentionally and functionally characterized phenotypes are a proper domain for ethological investigation
|Keywords||Ethology cognitive ethology play intentionality evolution definition|
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References found in this work BETA
Colin Allen (1992). Mental Content. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (4):537-553.
Colin Allen (1992). Mental Content and Evolutionary Explanation. Biology and Philosophy 7 (1):1-12.
Colin Allen & Marc D. Hauser (1991). Concept Attribution in Nonhuman Animals: Theoretical and Methodological Problems in Ascribing Complex Mental Processes. Philosophy of Science 58 (2):221-240.
Marc Bekoff (1975). The Communication of Play Intention: Are Play Signals Functional? Semiotica 15 (3).
Gordon M. Burghardt (1985). Animal Awareness: Current Perceptions and Historical Perspective. American Psychologist 40:905-919.
Citations of this work BETA
Marc Bekoff (1994). But is It Research? What Price Interdisciplinary Interests? Biology and Philosophy 9 (2):249-252.
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