Online research in philosophy

In this book, Roslyn Weiss contends that, contrary to prevailing notions, Plato's Crito does not show an allegiance between Socrates and the state that condemned him. Denying that the speech of the Laws represents the views of Socrates, Weiss deftly brings to light numerous indications that Socrates provides to the attentive reader that he and the Laws are not partners but antagonists in the argument and that he is singularly unimpressed by the case against escaping prison presented by the Laws. Weiss's greatest innovation is her contention that the Laws are very much like the judges who preside at Socrates' trail--interested not in justice and truth but in being shown deference and submission. If Weiss's argument is correct, then the standard conception of the history of political thought is in error--political philosophy begins not with the primacy of the state over the citizen but with the affirmation of the individual's duty to act in accordance with his own careful determination of what justice demands.

One noticeable omission in the otherwise ever flourishing literature on Plato's Crito (and one might say on the early Platonic dialogues in general) is the recognition that Plato is presenting a problem from a virtue ethical angle. This is no doubt due to the fact that Aristotle, rather than Plato is regarded as the originator of Virtue Ethics as a branch of philosophy.1 Plato's own contribution to the discipline is more often than not bypassed.2 This has unfortunate consequences not only for Platonic scholarship, but also for the study of Virtue Ethics. What the latter loses by not considering the Crito as a central text is an opportunity to expand into the domain of political philosophy.3..

This essay relates Plato’s views on Homeric justice in the Apology and Crito to current domestic and foreign policy. Applying the insights of these dialogues to contemporary issues of war and civil liberties, the essay contends that the separation of time and the foreignness of culture may aid our decisionmaking if we take the time to consider the lessons offered to us across the centuries. Plato assists in this bridging process through the literary device of the dialogue. The dialogues provide the opportunity to involve the reader personally in the ongoing struggle to come to grips with what is central to human life. The last section of this essay will link the relevance of ancient thought to contemporary issues such as Abu Ghraib tortures and Guantanamo detentions in the light of the earlier sections’ consideration of the Apology and the Crito.

Socrates does not use the Laws' Speech in the Crito principally to persuade Crito to accept his coming execution. It is used instead to persuade Crito to examine and work on his inadequate view of justice. Crito's view of justice fails to coordinate one's duties to friends and those to the law. The Laws' Speech accomplishes this persuasive goal by accompanying Crito?s earlier speech. Both start from the same view of justice, one that Crito accepts, but reach opposing conclusions. Crito cannot judge between the two appealing speeches. His understanding of justice is too confused for him to decide well how to help Socrates. His need to explain what happened the morning he visited Socrates will prompt him and others to examine this indeterminate view of justice. Socrates foregoes direct refutation because Crito will not abide that usual way of interrogation. Engaging in short question-and-answer conversation is not the only way to bring a person to aporia and the intention to examine oneself. Socrates does not here undermine his assertions in the Apology about his ignorance, lack of interest in teaching, constant philosophizing, and his belief that what he does is question, examine, and test those he talks to.

Plato's Crito is not a treatise on obedience to the law, but a dialogue whose interpretation is not determined by its surface meaning. The initial dream is not mere ornamentation; rather it points to the range of possibilities in Socrates' situation. The speeches of the Laws, with which the dialogue closes, are not intended to be philosophically cogent, since they are inconsistent with the principles laid out in the preceding conversation between Socrates and Crito. The arguments of the Laws are rather directed towards Crito, Socrates' decent and unphilosophic friend.