Logical pluralism and semantic information

Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694 (2007)
Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore
Keywords logical pluralism  semantic information  substructural logics
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DOI 10.2307/30226912
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Patrick Allo (2010). A Classical Prejudice? Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1-2):25-40.

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