Logical pluralism and semantic information

Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694 (2007)
Abstract
Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore
Keywords logical pluralism  semantic information  substructural logics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,399
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Allo (2010). A Classical Prejudice? Knowledge, Technology and Policy 23 (1-2):25-40.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

61 ( #25,507 of 1,102,949 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #29,681 of 1,102,949 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.