Mirror, Mirror in the Brain, What's the Monkey Stand to Gain?

Noûs 44 (2):372 - 391 (2010)
Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called "mirror neurons" in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionahty, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical work and perhaps a rejection of the standard philosophical view
Keywords mirror neurons  animal mind  intentionality  theory of mind
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DOI 10.2307/40660519
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Axel Seemann (2011). Joint Motor Action and Cross-Creature Embodiment. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):279-301.

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