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- Dale Jamieson & Marc Bekoff (1992). On Aims and Methods of Cognitive Ethology. Philosophy of Science Association 1992:110-124.
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Cognitive ethology cannot be done well unless its proximate philosophical underpinnings are got straight; this paper tries to help with that. Cognitive attributions are essentially explanatory—if they did not explain behavior, there would be no justification for them—but it doesn’t follow that they explain by providing causes for events that don’t have physical causes. To understand how mentalistic attributions do work, we need to focus on the quartet: sensory input, belief, desire, and behavioral output. We also need to be able to study classes of sensory inputs—one-shot deals are uninterpretable. The crucial guiding rule is, roughly: The animal’s behavior shouldn’t be explained by attributing to it the belief that P unless the behavior occurs in sensory circumstances belonging to a class whose members are marked off in some way that involves the concept of P and not in any way that is lower than that. The higher/lower distinction can be understood so that the guiding rule is helpful not only in deciding what thoughts to attribute to an animal but also in deciding whether to attribute any thoughts at all.
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Cognitive ethology began with Donald R. Griffin's 1976 publication of The Question of Animal Awareness. More recently mutual influences can be found between cognitive ethology and comparative, developmental, experimental and cognitive psychology and philosophy of science and of mind. Present scientific work emphasizes: 1) animal cognitive capacities including discrimination, categorization, spatial knowledge, predator/prey relations such as "injury feigning" by birds, deception and attribution of intention, 2) communication, both natural systems and artificial "language" and cognition projects undertaken with apes, birds, and sea mammals and 3) the possibility of animal consciousness. For the future, one hopes for developments in those areas, more field research, conceptual and methodological bridges to other disciplines, and philosophical work on the theoretical foundations of cognitive ethology and naturalizing intentionality.
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The famous ethological maxim known as “Morgan’s Canon” continues to be the subject of interpretive controversy. I reconsider Morgan’s canon in light of two questions: First, what did Morgan intend? Second, is this, or perhaps some re-interpretation of the canon, useful within cognitive ethology? As for the first issue, Morgan’s distinction between higher and lower faculties is suggestive of an early supervenience concept. As for the second, both the canon in its original form, and various recent re-readings, offer nothing useful to cognitive ethology.
Our goal in this paper is to provide enough of an account of the origins of cognitive ethology and the controversy surrounding it to help ethicists to gauge for themselves how to balance skepticism and credulity about animal minds when communicating with scientists. We believe that ethicists’ arguments would benefit from better understanding of the historical roots of ongoing controversies. It is not appropriate to treat some widely reported results in animal cognition as if their interpretations are a matter of scientific consensus. It is especially important to understand why loose references to “cognitive ethology” by philosophers can signal ignorance of the field to scientists who are more deeply immersed in the relevant literature. Understanding the variety of approaches to cognitive phenomena in animals is essential if such capacities are to form the foundation of scientifically-informed ethical reasoning about animals.
In this review of Allen & Bekoff's Species of Mind (1997), underlying theoretical assumptions of cognitive ethology are examined from a biological and philosophical viewpoint. In particular, the aim of the book to constitute a foundational concept for cognitive ethology is addressed. The ambiguity of theory-of-mind approaches in animal cognition is discussed as a major problem for causal explanations in behavioural biology.
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The heart of this book is the reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition.
Cognitive ethology is the comparative study of animal cognition from an evolutionary perspective. As a sub-discipline of biology it shares interest in questions concerning the immediate causes and development of behavior. As a part of ethology it is also concerned with questions about the function and evolution of behavior. I examine some recent work in cognitive ethology, and I argue that the notions of mental content and representation are important to enable researchers to answer questions and state generalizations about the function and volution of behavior.
In 1963 Niko Tinbergen published a paper, "On Aims and Methods of Ethology," dedicated to his friend Konrad Lorenz. Here Tinbergen defines ethology as "the biological study of behavior," and seeks to demonstrate "the close affinity between Ethology and the rest of Biology." Tinbergen identifies four major areas of ethology: causation, survival value, evolution, and ontogeny. Our goal is to attempt for cognitive ethology what Tinbergen succeeded in doing for ethology: to clarify its aims and methods, to distinguish some of its varieties, and to defend the fruitfulness of the research strategies that it has spawned.
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