Revelation and the Nature of Colour

Dialectica 65 (2):153-176 (2011)
Abstract
According to naïve realist (or primitivist) theories of colour, colours are sui generis mind-independent properties. The question that I consider in this paper is the relationship of naïve realism to what Mark Johnston calls Revelation, the thesis that the essential nature of colour is fully revealed in a standard visual experience. In the first part of the paper, I argue that if naïve realism is true, then Revelation is false. In the second part of the paper, I defend naïve realism against a number of objections
Keywords Colour  Primitivism  Naive Realism  Revelation
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References found in this work BETA
Keith Allen (2009). Being Coloured and Looking Coloured. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 647-670.
Keith Allen (2007). The Mind-Independence of Colour. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):137–158.

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