Revelation and the Nature of Colour

Dialectica 65 (2):153-176 (2011)
According to naïve realist (or primitivist) theories of colour, colours are sui generis mind-independent properties. The question that I consider in this paper is the relationship of naïve realism to what Mark Johnston calls Revelation, the thesis that the essential nature of colour is fully revealed in a standard visual experience. In the first part of the paper, I argue that if naïve realism is true, then Revelation is false. In the second part of the paper, I defend naïve realism against a number of objections
Keywords Colour  Primitivism  Naive Realism  Revelation
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01261.x
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
David J. Chalmers (2006). Perception and the Fall From Eden. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 49--125.

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Citations of this work BETA
Hagit Benbaji (forthcoming). Why Colour Primitivism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.

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