Superdupersizing the mind: Extended cognition and the persistence of cognitive bloat

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):791-806 (2013)
Extended Cognition (EC) hypothesizes that there are parts of the world outside the head serving as cognitive vehicles. One criticism of this controversial view is the problem of “cognitive bloat” which says that EC is too permissive and fails to provide an adequate necessary criterion for cognition. It cannot, for instance, distinguish genuine cognitive vehicles from mere supports (e.g. the Yellow Pages). In response, Andy Clark and Mark Rowlands have independently suggested that genuine cognitive vehicles are distinguished from supports in that the former have been “recruited,” i.e. they are either artifacts, or, products of evolution. I argue against this proposal. There are counter examples to the claim that “Teleological” EC is either necessary or sufficient for cognition. Teleological EC conflates different types of scientific projects, and inherits content externalism’s alienation from historically impartial cognitive science.
Keywords Extended cognition  Andy Clark  Mark Rowlands  Teleology  Swampman  Extended mind  supersizing  cognitive bloat  mark of the cognitive
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9914-7
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