Graduate studies at Western
Cambridge University Press (2005)
|Abstract||This major contribution to the study of F.H. Bradley, the most influential member of the nineteenth century school of British Idealist philosophers, offers a sustained interpretation of his Principles of Logic. After explaining how it is possible for inferences to be valid and yet have conclusions containing new information, James Allard describes how this solution provides a basis for Bradley's metaphysical view that reality is one interconnected experience. In the process he uncovers a new problem as to the nature of truth.|
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|Call number||B1618.B74.A48 2005|
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