The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection

Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective.
Keywords Closure  Common Knowledge  Deductive Omniscience  Distributed Knowledge  Epistemic Logic  Introspection  Knowability
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré (2009). Inexact Knowledge with Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179 - 227.
    Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno, Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

    View all 30 references

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Krista Lawlor (2005). Living Without Closure. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
    Guido Melchior (2010). Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (30):259-285.
    Stewart Cohen (1998). Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):143-159.
    Stewart Cohen (1998). Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):143 - 159.
    Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré (2009). Inexact Knowledge with Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179 - 227.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-09-07

    Total downloads

    32 ( #45,914 of 1,089,047 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    5 ( #20,082 of 1,089,047 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.