The mind-independence of colour

European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):137–158 (2007)
The view that the mind-dependence of colour is implicit in our ordinary thinking has a distinguished history. With its origins in Berkeley, the view has proved especially popular amongst so-called ‘Oxford’ philosophers, proponents including Cook Wilson (1904: 773-4), Pritchard (1909: 86-7), Ryle (1949: 209), Kneale (1950: 123) and McDowell (1985: 112). Gareth Evans’s discussion of secondary qualities in “Things Without the Mind” is representative of this tradition. It is his version of the view that I consider in this paper
Keywords color   objectivity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00258.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,651
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Wilfrid S. Sellars (1956). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Keith Allen (2009). Being Coloured and Looking Coloured. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 647-670.
Hagit Benbaji (2015). Why Colour Primitivism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):243-265.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

141 ( #30,177 of 1,902,527 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

16 ( #46,271 of 1,902,527 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.