Philosophy of Science 34 (3):260-272 (1967)
|Abstract||Philosophers have long believed that if the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles were logically true, there would be no problem of individuation. I show (a) that if spatial relations are, as seems plausible, of such a nature that it makes no sense to say of one thing that it is related to itself, then the Principle is a logical truth, asserting that a certain kind of state of affairs is impossible because the kind of sentence purporting to express it is ill-formed and (b) that even if the Principle were such a truth the problem of individuation would remain. I then examine some of what Leibniz and Wittgenstein have said about the notions of individuation, difference and nonidentity|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ralph M. Blake (1927). The Identity of Indiscernibles and the Principle of Individuation. Philosophical Review 36 (1):44-57.
Ralf M. Bader (2012). The Non-Transitivity of the Contingent and Occasional Identity Relations. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):141-152.
Rafael De Clercq (2005). A Criterion of Diachronic Identity Based on Locke's Principle. Metaphysica 6 (1):23-38.
Edwin B. Allaire (1968). Relations and the Problem of Individuation. Philosophical Studies 19 (4):61 - 63.
Michael Quante (2007). The Social Nature of Personal Identity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):56-76.
Steven French (1989). Why the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is Not Contingently True Either. Synthese 78 (2):141 - 166.
Michael J. Loux (ed.) (1970/1976). Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology. University of Notre Dame Press.
Robin Jeshion (2006). The Identity of Indiscernibles and the Co-Location Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):163–176.
Bas C. Fraassen & Isabelle Peschard (2008). Identity Over Time: Objectively, Subjectively. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):15-35.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads23 ( #60,137 of 722,742 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,742 )
How can I increase my downloads?