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- Jonathan Allen (1998). The Situated Critic or the Loyal Critic? Rorty and Walzer on Social Criticism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 24 (6):25-46.This article addresses the question whether the model of social criticism as 'connected' or 'loyal' which is advanced by Richard Rorty and Michael Walzer offers an adequate picture of social criticism. Two claims are made. First, it is suggested that loyalty is an internally conflicted concept, with three components: a recognition of situatedness in a particular relationship; an affirmation of that relationship by the loyal agent; a set of values or local principles. Where the third component is prominent, loyalty is more reflective and distanced; where the second component predominates, loyalty slips into unreflective commitment. Second, it is argued that Rorty and Walzer conflate the social critic's recognition of his or her situatedness in contexts of power with the affirmation of that situatedness. It is concluded that the model of loyal social criticism is mislead mg, and that the practice of the critic must be tempered by the operation of the sense of injustice. Key Words: connection • loyalty • Rorty • social criticism • Walzer.Reading list | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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| | Other links: psc.sagepub.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Neither employer expectations of loyalty, nor good treatment of employees by employers, nor employee appreciation of employers, nor the duty of nonmaleficence, nor the intention to be loyal, nor the duty not to act disloyally provide a basis for a moral or ethical duty of employee loyalty. However, in addition to the law, a pledge to be loyal can obligate one to be loyal. But if the specific content of such a pledge is unstated, the conduct required by the pledge may be indefinite. Moreover, the content and implications of loyalty are fluid, varying from context to context. Consequently, there is only a limited basis for the thesis that employees owe loyalty to their employers.
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| | Other links: jstor.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Reading list
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Philosophers, political theorists, and all readers seriously interested in the possibility of a moral life will find sustenance and inspiration in this book.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The attempt to connect philosophy and social hope has been one of the key distinguishing features of critical theory as a tradition of enquiry. This connection has been questioned forcefully from the perspective of a post-philosophical pragmatism, as articulated by Rorty. In this article I consider two strategies that have been adopted by critical theorists in seeking to reject Affection Rorty's suggestion that we should abandon the attempt to ground social hope in philosophical reason. We consider argumentative strategies of the philosophical anthropologist and of the rational proceduralist. Once the exchanges between Rorty and these two strands of critical theory have been reconstructed and assessed, an alternative perspective emerges. It is argued that philosophical reasoning best helps to sustain social hope in a rapidly changing world when we consider it in terms of the practice of democratic criticism.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Truth, the pragmatist claims, is something we make, not something which corresponds to reality. If this view of truth is accepted, Rorty notes, two problems arise: the pragmatist will have little to say to those who abuse others, because he or she will not be able to point to some universal standards that the abusers are vio lating ; and the torturers may be able to quote pragmatic principles in their own defence. Rorty argues that the pragmatist can reduce cruelty by splitting himself or herself into public and private parts. I examine this problem and Rorty's solution. I argue that his solution fails for two reasons: first, keeping our public and private selves apart is unlikely to reduce cruelty; and, second, he cannot maintain the public/private split. Consequently, Rorty is unable to deal with the anti-pragmatic criticism that his theory of truth could lead to an increase in cruelty. Key Words: democracy • liberalism • political theory • pragmatism • Richard Rorty.
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| | Other links: psc.sagepub.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This volume collects a number of important and revealing interviews with Richard Rorty, spanning more than two decades of his public intellectual commentary, engagement, and criticism. In colloquial language, Rorty discusses the relevance and nonrelevance of philosophy to American political and public life. The collection also provides a candid set of insights into Rorty's political beliefs and his commitment to the labor and union traditions in this country. Finally, the interviews reveal Rorty to be a deeply engaged social thinker and observer.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This paper is an analysis of Michael Walzer's (1977) argument concerning British bombing policy during the Second World War. Walzer had argued that the British bombing early in the war was morally permissible as an example of a "supreme emergency." The argument here is twofold. First, Walzer's historical reconstruction of the British situation is judged inadequate. Second, even assuming Walzer's factual description, his theoretical argument is incomplete. Walzer fails to appreciate the moral difficulty of the politician who acts in such a way as to initiate an immoral social practice in order to defeat an evil political system, especially when this social practice becomes a feature of our common life. Certain other features of Walzer's account are also explored.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This article calls for a critical re-evaluation of Walzer’s theory of justice. It argues that there is a deep tension between Walzer’s social criticism and his complex equality. Social criticism is based on the normative value of a connected and ‘whole’ self, and complex equality is based upon a value pluralism that threatens to fragment this sense of wholeness. Walzer therefore commissions a tacit premise, borrowing from the same ‘political philosophy’ that he explicitly repudiates, and which social criticism is intended to supplant. This premise is a Kantian-inspired conception of self; brought to the argument as an a priori premise and thus in violation of Walzer’s own stated commitment to ‘internalism’ and ‘interpretation’. Furthermore, this same conception of self is the moral source of Walzer’s substantive commitment to the universal value of pluralist political regimes. The article closes with a suggested reconciliation of the inherent tension within Walzer’s theory.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This paper explores Michael Walzer's vision of social criticism in view of his theoretical and historical work on justice and politics. Concentrating on the concept of shared understandings and political participation, I argue that Walzer's early theoretical work leads directly to his more recent emphasis on the connectedness of the social critic and his insistence that the critic must appeal to the common language and beliefs of the community he or she criticizes. The primary question I raise is whether Walzer ultimately places too much emphasis on forms of immanent critique. I explore this question by turning to the work of Sharon Welch and Cornel West. Both thinkers offer visions of social criticism that avoid the universalism and detachment Walzer criticizes, but their understanding of marginalization and their involvement in religious communities allows them more critical distance than Walzer allows.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of Jonathan Allen, The situated critic or the loyal critic? Rorty and Walzer on social criticism
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